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This paper outlines a collaborative program of work being carried out under an
agreement between the US and the UK which started in January 2000 and is due to
continue for four years. The research and is looking at the operational problems of
coalition force interoperability initial from a naval perspective at the command and
combat system level but then moving to a wider domain to cover both land and air
participation. Details are given of why the research is necessary, the objectives and the
approach being adopted. It then provides some information on the experiences gain from
the initial trials which have been carried out during the first six months of this year.
1. Introduction
Successful deployment of interoperable systems is essential in the emerging era of
network-centric warfare. Increasing reliance on joint and coalition forces to achieve naval
objectives has made more urgent the need for operational integration of diverse naval
combat systems.  The rapid introduction of Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS)
technology aboard ships, particularly information technology, has yielded many benefits,
but has resulted in new problems as well.  There is a pressing need to address some of
these issues before the operational units are deployed into a hostile environment, at which
time the lack of effective interoperability may adversely effect the ability of the
participating units to work together.  In this paper a collaborative research programme is




Under the auspices of the US-UK Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) concerning
Technical Research and Development Projects (TRDP), a new collaboration programme
on Naval Combat System Interoperability (NCSI) has been negotiated to evaluate how
naval combat systems can be integrated for effective coalition force operations at
platform and task force level in the context of the performance constraints associated
with technical aspects such as architectural choices for such systems and the command
issues such as interpretation of information.
It is the intent of this collaboration to expand the capability of both the UK and US
defence communities to evaluate candidate technologies and architectures to improve the
effectiveness of such operations.  To that end, a set of UK test-beds will be integrated
with each other and with a similar set of US test-beds to permit testing of greater scope.
The first of these sites will represent the various naval domains (i.e. surface and
subsurface) and, initially, the experimentation will address command level information
exchange between the US and UK combat systems.  The investigation will then move on
to address the feasibility of task force integration at the sensor data level aiming at the
final objective of allowing full naval task force data fusion to be carried out. Later stages
will be expanded to include both the land and air elements of a combined task force.
The first stage of the project is being conducted as a joint effort specifically addressing
information system architecture support for interoperability.  The expected payoffs
include:
• a wide-area network-based experimentation and interoperability capability that
encompasses surface and subsurface combat systems for both the US and UK navies
and is capable of addressing coalition force issues,
• understanding of the technical constraints and necessary architectural standards for
assuring effective interoperability of naval combat systems,
• a modified design process for combat systems that reflects architecture-based
development and standards-based architecture.
It will in the longer term provide a facility which can be employed to test out the
coalition force capabilities in all areas of command, weapon and sensors fits before they
are deployed in future platforms.
3. Scope of the Collaboration
The following work will be carried out under the agreement. It will be divided into
several phases each of which will culminate with the generation of a demonstration to be
carried out jointly between the two participants to show the achievements of the research
work.
Phase I.         Design, implementation and interconnection of NUWC and DERA
Portsdown Open Systems Test beds to be utilised for a limited demonstration of
COTS/OSA technology. This will allow for a one to one link and provide proof of
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concept for the future experimentation at the hardware level . It will also set the
foundation for a common sim/stim capability to drive the experimentation and cover the
exchange of basic picture information. The major activities are firstly to establish the link
by the passing of tactical picture data and associated scenario information through the
existing CORBA and DIS links and the sharing of control by both sides
Phase II.  Design, implementation and interconnection of OSA test beds at NUWC,
NSWCDD, DERA Portsdown, and DERA Winfrith to support an expanded
demonstration of US NSSN and SC21 OSA technologies and UK CSTDF/CSI
COTS/OSA technologies. This will expand on the levels of information which will be
transferred between the systems and form the basis for the investigation of sensor
information exchange which will enable additional data to be passed using CORBA and
HLA or DIS.
Phase III. Advanced interoperability demonstrations using US and UK COTS/OSA
technologies. This will expand on the level of complexity in the type of scenario and
interaction between the sensor and command aspects of the systems and investigate the
task force implications.  It will also address the integration of information into the
scenario from other than naval sources and examine the increased level of complexity
this will generate.
4. Background
4.1 Scope and Nature of the Application Domain
The naval combat system is a complex development challenge.  The system typically
incorporates extensive information processing capabilities.  The electronics fills an attack
center manned by numerous skilled console operators.  The software runs to nearly ten
million lines of code.
This extremely large man-machine system operates in real-time to transform data from
thousands of sensor elements into information on which the attack center staff predicates
decisions that effect ship control/maneuver, identification, classification and localization
of contacts, and deployment of weapons and countermeasures.  The system must operate
effectively twenty-four hours a day for months at a time.  It must be resilient in the face
of attempts by outside forces to manipulate, confuse, and defeat it.  It must be
maintainable in situ by the crew that interacts with it.  The most important time for it to
operate with maximum efficiency is when it is completely overloaded.  Obviously,
operability is a major concern with a requirement for information display to operators to
be highly intuitive so as to minimize reaction time and maximize optimal decision-
making.
Because the combat system is so large, it must be subdivided into smaller parts to
facilitate its development.  Intellectual control over the development could not be attained
without doing so.  Also, the parallel development activity that results reduces the
development cycle time.  Experience has shown that the down side is a challenging
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integration activity at the end of the development cycle where available funds and
schedule are always most strained.
Because combat systems are so expensive, there is a need to construct them from already
available modules or ones previously invested in.  It is not feasible to throw the previous
generation combat system away and start the new development from scratch every few
years as appears to be the process in the commercial world.  Thus, the notion of “reuse”
of previously developed items and the adoption of COTS technology is particularly
attractive.
Also, because combat systems are driven by the need to meet real time performance
constraints, it is important to take advantage of rapid advances in hardware and software
technology.  To assure that performance goals are met, it is important to design the
system in such a way that it readily admits the replacement of components with more
advanced technology that provides performance gains.  Thus the concept of an open
architecture is of more than passing interest.
It is clear that modular construction, open architecture, COTS technology, and re-use of
available components are attractive notions as regards combat system development.  In a
real sense, the combat system is an interoperable system of subsystems.  The most recent
challenge for the naval platforms is to further require that these combat system as a whole
interoperate with other fleet combat systems to prosecute battle force, joint, and/or
coalition force missions.
4.2 Interoperability and the Combat System
In a development world centered on the reuse of COTS piece parts, the traditional
definition of “development” becomes obsolete.  Instead, the development activity
becomes predominantly an integration and test activity.  That integration and test activity
is aimed at achieving an effective assemblage of linked subsystems that must interoperate
effectively to provide a platform-level combat system capability.  As has been noted, that
platform-level combat system must also be capable of interoperation with other platform
combat systems to achieve successful collaborative prosecution of battle force missions.
It is instructive to consider the source of the interoperability mandate.  There are three
seminal factors at play here.  They are the reduction in defense budgets, the expansion of
mission requirements, and the emergence of casualty avoidance as a priority in armed
conflict.  The reduction in defense budgets has resulted in a significant consolidation of
defense industry and a significant reduction in the size of defense forces, thus reducing
the marketplace for defense products.  These, in turn have led to increasing partnership
(among corporate entities, between government and industry, and among the defense
acquisition activities in allied countries) in developing such specialized products as
combat systems.  The expansion of mission requirements and the casualty avoidance
mandate have contributed to a significant expansion of information needs.  In the one
case, new missions result in new information being needed to deal with previously
unprecedented activities.  In the other case, avoiding casualty means having information
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of such a precise nature that physical risk to combatants and non-combatants alike is
minimized.  The casualty avoidance strategy, coupled with the expanded information
needs results in an increasing focus on information warfare as the first best way to fight.
The fact that defense forces are smaller and yet require greater information assets means
that coalition force operations are more and more the norm.  The net result of all of this is
that interoperability is a key performance objective for combat systems of all kinds.
It is clear that interoperability is a highly desirable attribute for a combat system.  It is
much less clear how to achieve interoperability goals through application of specific
design guidelines.  Intuitively, use of COTS products and open architecture are important
to cost-effective achievement of interoperable systems.  However, there is much
confusion in defense acquisition circles over what the terms mean, much less how to
achieve interoperability.  Too many acquisition managers are ready to proclaim salvation
from adoption of COTS-based development and/or OSA without really understanding the
impact of their decisions in this regard.
It may even be the case that COTS technology is in conflict with the mission critical
environment.  Military systems would certainly benefit from the ability to rapidly insert
components with improved technology.  Leading edge capability at the earliest moment
is highly desirable.  Therefore, rapid insertion of COTS technology supported by open
system engineering of the combat system appears inherently beneficial.  However,
consider that the military environment demands assured, intuitive operability of the
combat system.  Commonality of user interface has a very high priority if operators are to
do the optimal thing instinctively.  But the very fact that there are competing products in
the marketplace derives from their differences, not their commonality.  If they did not
have some claim to uniqueness they would have no place in the market.  Thus, the
diversity of implementations deriving from the COTS marketplace considerations poses
operability risks in an open system environment.  An important problem then is where to
draw the line between identicality which preserves operability and facilitates
interoperability and supportability, and diversity which provides for the fastest
availability of advanced capability, avoids obsolescence, and precludes vendor lock.
There are a number of other problems and weaknesses attending to COTS-based
development and open architecture as well.  Among these are:
• How to test and certify a system incorporating COTS components for which there is
no design disclosure
• How to handle configuration management in a COTS environment where items with
the same product model number may in fact incorporate different sub-elements with
subtle performance differences
• How to compute the total ownership costs of COTS-intensive systems
• How to change budgeting paradigms to support the shorter technological refresh
cycles and early obsolescence of COTS products
• How to provide fleet elements with a unified logistics support capability that
embraces COTS products
• How to define objective measures of openness of architecture
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5. TRDP Programme
The objectives of this TRDP is, through the design, implementation, integration and
utilisation of a set of interconnected Open Systems Architecture Test beds, to:
• leverage US and UK technology insertion programs in support of combat system
design for present and future operational platforms through mutual participation in
planned test events and demonstrations;
• establish a capability for wide area network-based experimentation to address the
evaluation of integrated Naval combat systems for effective coalition force operations
at platform and task force levels;
• collect data on the facility with which commercial hardware and software technology
components can be integrated with existing naval combat systems and new systems
employing heterogeneous components;
• identify issues associated with the naval combat system data interchange at the
command and sensor level; and
• evaluate, through experimental application, the effectiveness of advanced techniques
and tools in support of the construction, acquisition, and through life upkeep of naval
combat systems.
6. Initial experiments
As indicated by the Phase 1 description the first task will be to set up the basic
communications link and identify the commercial technology that is available to support
the exchange of combat system data. There is every reason to believe that while there are
claims made by industry that they have the technology there will need to be a
considerable amount of effort spent in producing an effective communication network
with the necessary levels of reliability in all areas. This will form the base for future work
and will be used to resolve all the issues associated with the ‘understanding’ of the data
which is exchanged. It will need to investigate the format and structure of information,
the information architecture, and allow both sides to reach an agreement on their
interpretation of that information within their own environment. There is no point in
exchanging data that is not useful and the early tests will need to identify the basic levels
that are acceptable by the two systems in terms of enhancing the system capability with
the introduction of new information but at the same time not overloading it with useless
data. There will be several tests over the first period of the TRDP culminating in a
demonstration of the basic capability to exchange combat system information on a
common scenario synchronised between the two sites. It will also demonstrate the
management and control software that will be needed to support the running and
monitoring of future experiments.
6.1 Interoperability between Surface and Subsurface Platforms
In a more general subject area, it will be necessary to investigate the relationship between
a subsurface platform and surface platform and the transfer of information between them.
It will be necessary to investigate the use of current datalinks (11 and 16) or other
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message formats and to consider whether the present operational procedures are
acceptable in the new network centric environment. It might be an appropriate time to
consider how best to handle the coalition force information in this situation as distinct
from the present data link scenarios.  Although existing L11 and L16 include some
subsurface message formats they have been used little to date
As has been indicated above the first set of experiments will involve achieving basic
synchronisation and interoperability between the two systems this will lead onto the more
network centric aspects of the coalition force environment.
Large scale information transfer involving submarines is likely to be performed on a
spasmodic basis, enabled only when a submarine is in contact with a surface platform.
The purpose of this area of research is to determine:
• The effect on the above water platform of integrating such spasmodic and time
varying information from a submarine into the rest of its tactical picture involving
organic and non organic wide area non real time information.
• The effect on the under water platform of integrating real time information into its
picture and subsequent handling of that data in terms of staleness, predictions etc.
This will build on the previous set of experiments which will have identified the types of
information that could be exchanged and how this could be managed. The aim at this
stage will be to compare the pictures compiled in the relevant surface and subsurface
platforms particularly as time progresses without refresh, to determine whether the degree
of drift between the actual and perceived positions outweighs the initial transfer of
information and whether better staleness or prediction measures could be used to improve
the pictures. It will also allow some assessment of the best options for interoperation
between the surface and subsurface platforms in terms of the procedures covering such
aspects as frequency of contact and amount of data exchanged.
6.2 Sensor Triangulation
As an example of the type of problem in the sensor domain the area of sonar triangulation
would involve the use of the CSI test bed as a future UK surface platform with say only a
passive sonar capability and the NUWC WAIF as the US subsurface platform with both
active and passive sonar.  The aim will be to investigate sonar triangulation between the
sonar data from the surface and subsurface platforms initially using techniques developed
for EW.
The first part of the task will be to determine what associated research is available within
the UK and the US including:
• above water passive EW triangulation techniques
• land EW techniques.
• underwater passive techniques.
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It will then be necessary to determine the level of information to be passed between the
surface and subsurface domains to perform the necessary calculations depending on the
chosen methods to be investigated. The foundations for this will have been set during the
earlier information architecture investigations.
The first part of the experiment will be to exchange information between the UK surface
and US subsurface pictures including:
• synchronisation data to allow time and grid synchronisation to be achieved;
• basic tactical picture data particularly surface platforms in the scenario which can be
used correlate the above and underwater pictures.
• the agreed passive sonar information;
Once the basic exchange of messages is achieved then a sonar triangulation trial can be
performed. Experiments will then be carried out to widen the scope of the sensors being
considered and to identify how best to utilise the data available from both ‘platform’ test
beds
This will form the basis for the next main area of research which will be addressing the
data fusion and picture generation in a coalition task force environment.
6.3 Force Data Fusion
Once the US network has been extended to link to other US surface platform testbed
facilities and the UK end has a similar extended capability, issues such as force data
fusion across the coalition surface and subsurface platforms can be investigated.  This
opens up the possibility for investigating:
• The different operating characteristics of the UK and US navies,
• The different data fusion methods employed,
• The opportunity to exchange sensor data information at all levels,
It will also provide the ability to investigate the remote use of sensors and weapons such
as EW, sonar, torpedoes and missiles between coalition platforms, initially starting with
the sub to surface link and then expanding to the different platforms in the network. The
network at this stage should be capable of allowing land and air platforms to be
integrated as part of the environment and the full coalition battle space scenario
addressed, building on the experience gained from the earlier investigations and
experiments.
A further area for investigation will be extending the experiences gained from the
investigations into the spasmodic type of interaction to see if any of the lessons learned
can be used in setting set up the joining and leaving procedures for a platform and a force
network in terms of what is required and how it is controlled.
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7. Effectiveness of Collaboration
In parallel with the research identified above, a major activity during this work must be
the identification of measures of effectiveness for coalition force activities. While it may
be possible to exchange information it is essential that there is some means of assessing
the effectiveness of what is being achieved. This will need to take into consideration both
the national and coalition requirements and to what level the coalition platform systems
will be integrated into a task force unit. It will of necessity not only address the technical
issues but will have to deal with the command and doctrinal issues which will arise.
8. Experience gain
The configuration of the collaborative system set up so far is shown in figure 1, this
identifies the network connectivity which has been used for the initial tests/trials to prove
out the connectivity and the capabilities of the system as a whole and also to allow those
involved to work out the necessary operating procedures for the interactions.
Fig 1 UK/US connectivity
The two sets of heterogeneous workstations are linked to their own internal networks at
both sites. The sites are then connected using a Remote Access System (RAS) and
Motorola Network Encryption System (NES), via ISDN lines.
The RAS provides terminal server and remote access services via analog and ISDN BRI
&PRI connections in a multi-protocol network environment. It consists of a base router
module, port expansion module and user installable I/O modules and it integrates multi-
protocol remote access server and WAN router technology with high performance
56Kpds (V.90) and/or ISDN modems.
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The NES is used to provide the security needed for the exchange over the link. It is a
security device designed to Secure Data Network System (SDNS) standards endorsed by
NSA, providing confidentiality, data integrity, peer identification, authentication and
audit services. They are configured to customer hardware requirements and are user
software configurable at the application software, Identity Based Access Control (IBAC)
table and static routing tables level.
From the UK point of view the four ISDN lines have not worked out as expected. The
actual bandwidth is not fixed and this has caused problems. The situation seems to be that
no bandwidth is guaranteed and even though they are 128k lines they may not be
operating at that level. This unpredictability has meant that on occasions the service over
the lines has not been adequate to support the level of communications required.
There has also been some problems with RAS which on occasions does not seem to be
able to cope with line failure in a controlled fashion. When one line fails or drops the
RAS does not look for the next available line but shuts itself off or crashes.
Fig 2  Trial configuration
It is clear from the experience gained so far using the configuration shown above that
there is a need for very sophisticated monitoring capabilities at all levels to provide the
information on what is happening at all times in the network. For example one of the
things we noticed is that the audio signal does not seem to be given priority over the
video during a video conferencing session but we are unable to monitor the network well
enough to see if this is the situation or not.
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Another problem which has been manifest on the UK side is the need for more
heterogeneous equipment to provide the ability to run a wider range of software for
evaluation rather than the under powered set of PCs which are available at present. As an
example, the limited capabilities of the current equipment means that unless the machine
has a separate video board fitted then the processor is fully loaded handling the video
requirements of the camera alone.
This aspect is also significant if we are to use the most up to date collaborative software
packages for the interaction.  Our present capability restricts what can be used and tried
by the lack of processor power as mentioned above and the restrictions caused by the use
of the Windows NT environment.
It is also important for someone within the team to have a detailed understanding of the
tool being used and to know how to configure it to provide the best results for use on the
specific network. An example is our use of Microsoft NetMeeting where there may be a
problem due to the incompatibility of the package size between it and the NES when
there is a high transfer load but again the monitoring is not good enough to be able to
identify this specifically as the problem. On the other hand the ability to share the desktop
under NetMeeting is a significant benefit to our ability to work together and the product,
although very much a generic tool, has been easy to use while the more specific ‘in
house’ tool has had some problems. These may well have been associated with our
limited understanding of it and the need to match it to our configuration.
From our limited experience so far these important points can be made:
• when putting this type of network together the ability to ‘try before buy’ in both the
hardware and the software domain is necessary
• the need for a close market technology watch to see where things are heading and who
the lead players are.  (It's no good selecting a piece of hardware/software if the vendor
is moving out of the market and will not be supporting it much longer even if it does
seem to be what is required at the time.)
• someone within the team must be an experienced user of any tools to ensure that they
are used effectively.
• there needs to be an heterogeneity within the workstation fit to benefit from the ability
to run different tools in their appropriate environments.( In this type of research, one
size does not fit all)
• adequate system wide monitoring is essential to find out what is happening when
things don’t work in the way which was expected.
9. Summary
The adoption of an early integration testing approach in the development of complex
systems has proven to be a success.  In fact, the U. S. Navy has since embarked on the
establishment of a Distributed Engineering Plant (DEP) and a Collaborative Engineering
Environment (CEE) modeled on their Wide Area Integration Facility (WAIF)
experiences. From an architectural perspective, the development issues and the
operational issues are seen to have much in common where test and integration are
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concerned. This approach is now being employed at the joint/coalition force level and the
avoidance of operational problems achievable as a result of adopting such an approach is
substantial.
Taken in its broadest view, interoperability is more than just connectivity and
communications.  Its import goes beyond just command and planning activities to
embrace real time sensor data integration among collaborating platforms. The drive for
interoperable combat systems is a natural consequence of the increasing emphasis on
information warfare, of the increasing reliance on joint and coalition forces to achieve
military objectives, of the increasing reliance on commercial technologies, and on the
decreasing defense acquisition and research and development budgets.  Needing or
desiring interoperability is not the same as achieving it however.  There remains much to
do to bring about the interoperable combat systems needed for success in the era of
network-centric operations and information warfare.
As we seek to manage an information landscape that is more comprehensive and diverse
each day, it is important to guard against the technological imperative to do things merely
because we can.  Access to all information all of the time is not the optimal design
objective for combat systems.  It is not even desirable.  We must also guard against the
tendency to confuse technology with engineering.  Proper use of technology requires that
we engineer our systems with careful attention to architectural issues.  There remains
plenty of work to do.  A near-term list might include:
Identifying the consequences of interfacing systems designed to different architectural
standards
Developing measures of architectural openness
Overcoming obstacles to wide-area distribution of time critical sensor-to-shooter loops
Determining the extent of necessary commonality in deployed information infrastructure
Understanding and coping with terminological and training barriers to interoperable
coalition force combat systems
Identification of an appropriate Combat System Interface Profile to support
interoperability
Developing criteria for managing the information landscape
The bottom line objective in the search for combat systems that are both operable and
interoperable must never be lost sight of: providing the right amount of the right
information to the right place at the right time in the right format.
The experience so far from the first phase has validated the basic tenant that the problems
under investigation are not simple. In order for two similar, yet fundamentally dissimilar,
systems to work together requires a common understanding of the terminology and ways
in which tasks are carried out.  The learning curve is steep and progress at times seems
slow but at least the problems are being identified and resolved before the real platforms,
and the related costs which that would incur, are involved.
